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When making intergroup evaluations we experience cognitive and affective 
responses. Given that the content of the cognitions or affective reactions are 
applicable and judged usable, each has the potential to influence one’s attitudes 
towards that group.  In a Pilot Study participants reported significantly more disgust 
than fear when thinking about gay men, and significantly more fear than disgust when 
thinking about African-Americans.  Studies 1 and 2 provided initial support that these 
specific emotional responses to social groups are moderated by the extent to which 
that information is judged as usable.   Data from Study 3 did not fully support my 
hypotheses, as personal relevance did not moderate the extent to which affect was 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
General Introduction 
The relative importance of affect and cognition as determinants of attitudes 
has been a constant theme in social psychology.  Whereas some have argued for the 
primacy of affect (Zajonc, 1980; 1984; Verplanken, Hofstee, & Janssen, 1998), others 
have argued that affect and cognition cannot be teased apart and claims that either 
cognition or affect is the primary determinant of attitude are inappropriate (Giner-
Sorolla, 2004; Lazarus, 1981; 1982).  Theories of attitude formation differ in the 
extent to which they acknowledge the influence of cognition and affect.  Fishbein and 
Azjen’s (1975) Expectancy Value Theory can be viewed primarily as a cognitive 
theory as it posits that attitudes are formed by summing the values of numerous 
beliefs about an attitude object.  Conversely the “feelings as information” approach 
can be viewed primarily as an affective theory as it proposes that individuals’ internal 
affective states serve as sources of information to assist them in making judgments 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 2003). 
  A discussion of the relative influence of affect and cognition also occurs in 
the literature on intergroup attitudes.  For example, we know that people who hold 
negative, rather than positive stereotypes about social groups also hold more negative 
attitudes towards those groups (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Sechrist & Stangor, 2001).  
People who report experiencing negative, rather than positive emotions when 




(Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991).  While some 
research indicates that the relationship between affect and intergroup attitudes is 
stronger than that between cognition and intergroup attitudes (Esses, Haddock, & 
Zanna, 1993; Haddock et al., 1993; Jussim, Nelson, Manis, & Soffin, 1995; Stangor 
et al., 1991), other research has shown that the relationship between cognition and 
intergroup attitudes is stronger than between affect and intergroup attitudes (Bos, 
Kok, & Dijker, 2001; Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1994).     
Focusing on the extent to which affective components influence attitudes, 
research has addressed whether or not certain emotions are more applicable than 
others when considering attitudes towards specific social groups (Cottrell and 
Neuberg, 2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002).  Cottrell 
and Neuberg (2005; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002) have shown that when thinking about 
gay men, participants report experiencing disgust but not fear, and while thinking 
about African-Americans, participants report fear but not disgust.  
Through a series of four studies, the present research expands our knowledge 
of the roles of affect and cognition as determinants of intergroup attitudes by 
proposing a model of how intergroup cognitions, affect, and attitudes are related.  I 
propose that in response to a social group, we experience both cognitions and 
affective responses about those groups.  For example, when thinking about Black 
individuals participants report cognitions such as “Blacks are violent”.  Similarly, 
when thinking about African-American individuals participants report affective 
reactions, such as experiencing fear (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg & Cottrell, 




that an individual is experiencing are applicable to the target group, each has the 
potential to influence one’s subsequent attitudes towards that group.  Applicability 
refers to the fit between stored knowledge and the stimulus that is being evaluated 
(Bruner, 1957).   Furthermore, the potential for each type of applicable information to 
influence a judgment is dependent on the extent to which that applicable information 
is then judged as usable.  Judged usability refers to the assessed appropriateness or 
relevance of applying stored knowledge to a stimulus (Higgins, 1996). Additionally, 
the extent to which information is judged as usable can be influenced by numerous 
factors including discounting effects, individual differences, and situational factors.   
Finally, just as particular cognitions are specific to a group, affective 
experiences are specific to a group, resulting in different emotional experiences.  
Furthermore, the emotion experienced by each group is related to the cognition held 
towards that group.  For instance I might be afraid of Blacks because I believe they 
are violent, while disgusted by gays because I associate male homosexuality with 
HIV/AIDS.  Therefore it should be stressed that in this model, it is not just that social 
groups elicit cognitions and emotions but that they elicit specific cognitions and 





Figure 1. Proposed model illustrating role of applicability and judged usability on the 
influence of specific emotions and cognitions on attitudes towards social groups. 
Cognitions as Determinants of Attitudes 
A popular framework for understanding the relationship between attitudes and 
beliefs is the expectancy-value model (Fishbein, 1963).  According to this model, 
attitudes are a function of the beliefs about the attitude object and the evaluative 
aspect of those beliefs.  People come to hold positive attitudes towards objects they 
believe have good attributes and negative attitudes towards objects that they believe 
have bad attributes.  A measure of an individual’s attitude towards an object should 
therefore correlate with measures that sum the individual’s evaluations of the positive 




(Cronen & Conville, 1975; Smith & Clark, 1973) have supported this prediction 
demonstrating moderate correlations between attitudes and beliefs. 
  The relationship between cognitions and attitudes has been a consistent theme 
in research on intergroup relations, including research on stereotyping and prejudice.   
According to Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, and Gaertner (1996), the traditional view 
of stereotypes and prejudice involves a fairly simple relationship between these two 
variables.  If stereotypes represent the cognitive component of prejudice (Allport, 
1954; Jost & Banaji, 1994), then greater stereotyping of a social group should be 
positively related to prejudiced attitudes towards that group.  
The extent to which stereotypes are related to prejudice has been examined 
across social groups including, but not limited to, gender (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989), 
age (Chiu, Chan, Snape, & Redman, 2001), and race (Dovidio et al., 1996).  Overall, 
the findings suggest a significant relationship between the extent to which one 
endorses stereotypes of a social group and the extent to which one holds prejudiced 
attitudes (Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986).  Eagly and Mladinic (1998) asked 
participants to complete open ended measures where they indicated their cognitive 
and affective reactions to women, men, Democrats, and Republicans.  They found 
that although both affect and cognition scores were correlated to participants’ self-
reported Likert-scale responses towards these social groups, the cognitive component 
of beliefs was the most significant predictor of attitudes in most situations.  Using a 
similar methodology, Chiu and colleagues (2001) assessed participants’ endorsement 
of stereotypes towards elderly individuals in both the United Kingdom and Hong 




adaptable” were related to prejudiced attitudes towards elderly individuals in the 
workplace in both the United Kingdom and Hong Kong.  Whereas the strength of this 
relationship throughout individual studies varies from small to at most modest, meta-
analyses provide stronger evidence for a modest and reliable relationship between 
stereotypes and prejudice (Dovidio et al., 1996; Stephan, Ageyev, Coates-Shrider, & 
Stephan 1994). 
Affect as Determinants of Attitudes 
Schwarz and colleagues (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 2003; Schwarz, Servay, & Kumpf, 1985; Schwarz, 
Strack, Kommer, & Wagner, 1987) have demonstrated that affect influences 
subsequent evaluations and attitudes when those affective states are used as sources 
of information.  According to the “feelings as information” perspective, individuals 
use their apparent affective responses to a target as a basis for their judgment.  In 
making an evaluation towards an object, individuals essentially ask themselves, “how 
do I feel about this?”  In this way, they seek out their affective experiences and rely 
on them as evidence, in the same sense that they would seek out and rely on their 
cognitive experiences.  A negative affective state that an individual experiences when 
thinking about an attitude object provides the individual with evidence that they have 
a negative attitude toward the object; a positive affective state that an individual 
experiences when thinking about an attitude object provides evidence that they have a 
positive attitude toward object.  Furthermore, because it is often difficult to 




evaluations of attitude objects are frequently influenced by affective states that are not 
elicited by the attitude object but rather a source unrelated to the target.  
The feelings as information perspective has been demonstrated in the 
misattribution of arousal paradigm.  In this paradigm, experimenters generally 
manipulate the participants’ affective states and then assess the extent to which these 
manipulations influence later evaluations.  These studies reveal that when participants 
are aware that their emotional experiences are the result of an experimental 
manipulation, due to a comment by the experimenter, these emotional experiences do 
not influence later evaluations.  However, when participants are not able to accurately 
attribute the true source of their emotional experiences, these emotions influence 
subsequent evaluations (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Schwarz et al., 1987).  
Keltner and colleagues (1993) asked participants to recall either a sad or anger 
causing experience.  Half of the participants were asked to describe how the sad or 
anger causing experience occurred, while the other half were asked to describe why it 
occurred.  It was assumed that for those in the first condition the emotions of sadness 
or anger would actually be elicited (hot condition), but in the second condition there 
was no expectation that these emotions would be elicited due to the more analytical 
nature of the instructions (cold condition).  Following the emotion manipulation 
participants then completed a questionnaire rating their ability to have control over 
future life events.  Results supported the feelings as information hypothesis as the 
reporting of sadness or anger in the hot condition influenced ratings of control over 
future life events while the reporting of sadness or anger in the cold condition did not 




In a similar study, German males were interviewed either after the German 
soccer team won or tied a game at the World Cup championships (Schwarz et al., 
1987).  It was hypothesized that participants would report greater life satisfaction 
when the interview was conducted after a win compared to when the interview was 
conducted after a tie.  In evaluating their overall life satisfaction, participants would 
rely on their positive affect, which was actually caused by the win, to determine that 
they were pleased with their lives.  The results supported this hypothesis with 
participants in the win condition reporting more positive responses on global life 
satisfaction measures than those participants in the tie condition. 
Further research in the area of intergroup relations has examined to what 
extent this relationship exists.  What is frequently found is that affect contributes 
more strongly to intergroup attitudes than do stereotypes (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 
1993; Haddock et al, 1993; Jussim, Nelson, Manis, & Soffin, 1995; Islam & Jahjah, 
2001; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991).  Stangor, Sullivan, and Ford (1991, Study 2) 
assessed participants’ endorsement of individual stereotypes, consensual stereotypes, 
and affective responses towards Blacks, Arabs, homosexuals, and Whites.  They 
found that emotional responses were the strongest and most consistent predictors of 
attitudes and social distance towards all four social groups when compared to 
individual and consensual stereotypes.  Similarly, Jussim and colleagues (1995) 
presented participants with vignettes of individuals who were described as either rock 
stars or child abusers.  The researchers also assessed participants’ beliefs and 
affective reactions towards these groups.  Overall the researchers found that a model 




contribution of cognition or both was the best predictor of attitudes towards the social 
groups described. 
Emotions as Determinants of Attitudes 
After examining the extent to which affect predicts intergroup attitudes one 
may then consider how specific emotions are related to intergroup attitudes.  
Stroessner, Hamilton and Mackie (1992) argue that since intergroup encounters 
involve diverse groups and even more diverse experiences one must consider how 
individual emotions can influence interpersonal attitudes.  Therefore, researchers 
have attempted to answer the question of which specific emotions are predictive of 
intergroup attitudes? 
Paradigms in this area of research typically identify a limited number of 
emotions that the researcher believes are theoretically related to the out-group of 
interest.  Participants are then instructed to think about that group and report the 
extent to which they feel each emotion.  Analyses then reveal which specific 
emotions predict attitudes toward specific social groups.  This research has been 
conducted on numerous minority and ethnic groups including, but not limited to, 
persons living with HIV/AIDS, Native Canadians, and African-Americans (Bos, Kok, 
& Dijker, 2001; Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; Dijker, Koomen, van den Heuvel, & 
Fridja, 1996; Esses & Dovidio, 2002; Pelzer & Dijker, 2002). 
Attitudes towards individuals living with HIV/AIDS have been studied taking 
into account the specific emotional reactions that are related to readiness for 
intergroup contact.  Dijker, Kok, and Koomen (1996) found that three emotions: pity, 




correlated with contact and fear and irritation negatively correlated with contact.  
Furthermore, pity was the strongest predictor while fear was the weakest.  These 
results however are inconsistent with two additional studies conducted by the same 
research team.  Bos and colleagues (2001) found that only fear, but not pity or anger, 
predicted willingness for personal contact.  It should be noted that the frequency in 
which emotions such as fear are reported regarding persons living with HIV/AIDS 
has differed across studies.  Dijker and colleagues (1996), for example, note that 
among Americans, participants frequently report feeling anger towards persons living 
with HIV/AIDS (Herek & Capitanio, 1993) whereas Dutch populations rarely report 
this emotion towards persons with HIV/AIDS. 
The research described above illustrates that numerous diverse emotional 
experiences are related to attitudes towards various social groups.  Several research 
teams have taken a further step, proposing models of intergroup attitudes that provide 
a theoretical explanation of why specific emotions end up associated with specific 
groups (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske et al., 2002; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002). 
According to Fiske and colleagues (2002), emotional reactions to out-group 
(and in-group) members can be determined by considering how those groups are 
appraised on two dimensions: competence and warmth.  Groups appraised high in 
competence and low in warmth evoke emotions of admiration and envy (i.e. rich 
people, Jews, Asians).  On the other hand, groups who are high in warmth and low in 
competence, such as disabled and elderly individuals, evoke feelings of pity.  Finally, 
those groups low in competence and warmth, such as poor and homeless individuals 




this model through self report studies in which participants were asked to indicate 
their feelings on groups such as those described above. Participants’ appraisals of 
competence and warmth and the corresponding emotions are consistent with the 
predictions described above.   
Neuberg and Cottrell (2002; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) have developed a 
biocultural model of intergroup threat and discrete emotions. In this model they 
emphasize the group context in which humans evolved, and hypothesize that people 
are wired by evolution to respond emotionally to group-level as well as individual-
level threats.  In this model different types of threats are distinguished: threats to in-
group resources, contamination to in-group health, and endangered group physical 
safety.  Furthermore, each of these threats elicits systematically different emotions.   
Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) asked participants to complete self-report 
measures of perceived threat and affective reactions towards several groups including 
but not limited to gay men and African-Americans.  They found that threat and 
emotion profiles were associated with each other in a manner the biocultural model 
would predict.  When responding to questions about gay men for example, 
participants reported threats to in-group health and the emotion of disgust; when 
responding to questions about African-Americans, participants reported threats to in-
group safety and the emotion of fear.  
The strength of both Fiske and colleagues’ (2002) and Cottrell and Neuberg’s 
(2005) is that they provide a theoretical explanation for why specific groups elicit 
specific emotions.  Furthermore, although these models differ in their explanations 




important underlying factor of applicability, or the fit between stored knowledge and 
the stimulus being evaluated (Bruner, 1957), as a determinant of which emotions 
specific groups elicit.  According to Fiske, feelings of contempt towards poor people 
occur because this emotion is related to the appraisals that are made towards these 
individuals; low competence and low warmth.  Similarly, according to Cottrell and 
Neuberg, the emotion of fear is applicable to evaluations of African-Americans 
because this emotion is related to threats to personal safety; threats that participants 
report about African-Americans.  Fear therefore, would not be an applicable 
emotional reaction to Asian-Americans because Asian-Americans do not elicit a 
threat of personal safety.   
It should also be pointed out that both Fiske and colleagues’ (2002) and 
Cottrell and Neuberg’s (2005) models precede an affective experience with a 
cognitive appraisal.  In both theories, an individual first holds a cognition towards a 
social group (i.e. “she is competent and warm” or “he is a threat to my personal 
safety”) and based upon that cognition, an emotion is elicited.  However, as Eagly 
and Chaiken (1993) pointed out, “Classical conditioning procedures can lead people 
to form attitudes towards objects without any conscious deliberation about those 
objects’ attributes” (p. 403).  Therefore, it is plausible that affective reactions towards 
a social group occur prior to a cognition, and therefore have the potential to precede 
cognitions.  For example, once fear is conditioned with African-Americans, it is 
possible that the mere presence of an African-American individual will elicit fear.  




cognition precedes affect.  What is important is that when applicable and judged 
usable, either source of information can influence attitudes towards social groups. 
The Role of Applicability and Judged Usability in Intergroup Judgments 
Before a cognition can influence a subsequent evaluation, the content of that 
cognition must be applicable to the target group.  The greater the relation between the 
stored knowledge of the stimulus and its attended features, the more applicable the 
stored knowledge is (Bruner, 1957). If stored knowledge or information is not 
applicable then it is not likely to influence subsequent judgments.  Higgins, Rholes, 
and Jones (1977), for example, presented participants with an ambiguous situation in 
which a colleague failed to greet another individual.  Prior to this presentation, 
participants were primed with personality traits.  They found that traits such as 
boring, which were not semantically related to the ambiguous behavior did not 
influence judgments of that behavior. On the other hand, those traits which were 
semantically related to the ambiguous behavior influenced subsequent judgments.  In 
the same manner that a personality trait has to be applicable to the judgment of an 
individual’s behavior, the cognitions we hold about a social group must be applicable 
in order for then to influence subsequent social judgments.   
 Similarly, if we consider our emotional states as sources of information 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 2003), the emotion that an individual is 
experiencing must be applicable towards a social group before it has the potential to 
influence attitudes and judgments. Unlike moods, emotions are tied to an object 
(Averill, 1980).  While we are in a bad mood, we are disgusted about something. For 




individuals associate fear but not disgust when thinking about African-Americans, 
and disgust but not fear when thinking about gay men.  We are afraid of Black 
individuals and disgusted by gay men.  Therefore we would expect an applicable 
emotion such as fear to influence attitudes towards African-Americans more than a 
non-applicable emotion such as disgust.  Conversely, we would expect an applicable 
emotion such as disgust to influence attitudes towards gay men more than a non-
applicable emotion such as fear.     
 Although it is necessary that the content of one’s cognitions and affective 
experiences are applicable to a social group to influence evaluations, it is not 
sufficient.  A heightened level of fear does not always influence our evaluations 
towards Blacks.  Similarly, applicability alone cannot explain the inconsistencies in 
research that have shown that in some situations affect plays a greater role than 
cognition (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Haddock et al., 1993; Jussim, Nelson, 
Manis, & Soffin, 1995; Stangor et al., 1991) while in other situations cognitions play 
a greater role than affect in intergroup attitudes (Bos, Kok, & Dijker, 2001; Eagly, 
Mladinic, & Otto, 1994).  I propose that the extent to which any source of applicable 
information influences social attitudes is dependent on the judged usability of that 
information.   
 According to Higgins (1996), judged usability refers to the judged 
appropriateness or relevance of applying stored knowledge to a stimulus.  Judged 
usability influences whether the activated and applicable knowledge will actually be 
used in a judgment.  It is not merely that stored “information”, whether it be cognitive 




appropriate or relevant and therefore used.  Studies have demonstrated that 
perceivers’ judgments of the relevance or appropriateness of particular information 
for their response can determine their use of that information (Kruglanski, Friedman, 
& Farkash, 1984).  Numerous factors have been found to influence judged usability 
including the framing of a task or problem (Trope & Ginosar, 1988), conversational 
norms (Strack, Martin, & Schwarz, 1988) and motivations to appear non-prejudiced 
(Devine, 1989).  Additionally, although judged usability is usually considered in 
terms of a controlled inhibitory process, it has also been examined as an automatic 
inhibitory process, through studies in which participants do not consciously attempt to 
block or suppress constructs that are accessible by a prime (Neely, 1977; Sedikes, 
1990). 
Judged usability and discounting. The feelings-as-information perspective 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983) can be examined by considering the role of judged 
usability. To the extent that it appears reasonable that our affective state reflects a 
reaction to the target, the current affect will influence the judgment (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1996).  However, we should discount our feelings as sources of information 
when there is reason to believe that our affective states do not reflect our reaction to 
the target.  If we can attribute another stimuli as the source of our affective state, then 
that affective reaction will not influence our judgments of the target.  Schwarz, 
Servay, & Kumpf (1985) assessed smokers’ attitudes and behaviors regarding 
smoking after viewing a fear-arousing anti-smoking video.  They found that when 
participants were led to believe that a pill they took had no side effects regarding 




behaviors, with participants reporting smoking less cigarettes and having a greater 
intention to quit.  However, when participants were informed that the pill they took 
had a side effect of increased arousal, the fear-arousing anti-smoking video did not 
influence their attitudes and behaviors towards smoking.  Although the emotion of 
fear was applicable information, it was no longer judged as usable information.  
“Why should I base my attitude on how I feel when my feelings are the result of this 
pill I took?” 
Judged usability and individual differences. Additionally, the evaluation of 
the judged usability of affective versus cognitive information can by influenced by 
individual differences.  Huskinson and Haddock (2004) for example argue that 
variables such as the Need for Affect (Maio & Esses, 2001) influence the extent to 
which individuals rely on affective and cognitive information to form attitudes.  
Individuals who are high in Need for Affect are motivated to seek out and engage in 
emotional experiences.  Because these individuals value emotional experiences, they 
are likely to judge them as more appropriate when forming intergroup attitudes, 
compared to individuals who are low in Need for Affect. 
  Huskinson and Haddock (2004) demonstrated that individuals high in Need 
for Affect do appear to differ in the extent to which affect and cognitions relate to 
intergroup attitudes.  In addition to completing the Need for Affect scale (Maio & 
Esses, 2001) participants completed three semantic differential measures that assessed 
attitudes, affect, and cognitions towards various social groups and policies such as 
gay men and abortion.  The attitude semantic differential included items such as 




and relaxed-angry.  The cognition measure included items such as useful-useless, and 
imperfect-perfect.   Huskinson and Haddock found that high scores on the Need for 
Affect scale were associated with higher correlations between the attitude and affect 
semantic differential scales, but not associated with higher correlations between the 
attitude and cognition semantic differential scales, results that suggest that high Need 
for Affect participants may chronically rely on affective information to form attitudes.   
Additional research has tested and provided support for the hypothesis that 
information that matches an individual’s processing modality, which may be 
influenced by individual difference factors, is more influential in attitude formation 
and persuasion compared to information that does not match an individual’s 
processing modality (Edwards, 1990; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; van den Berg, 
Manstead, van der Pligt, & Wigboldus, 2006).  Van den Berg and colleagues, for 
example induced a cognitive or affective orientation by having participants complete 
a word search puzzle that contained either affectively or cognitively based words.  
They then read information about a novel animal that either contained positive 
affective information and negative cognitive information, or negative affective 
information and positive affective information.  They found that when individuals 
were in an affective orientation, their evaluations of the animal were more consistent 
with the valence of the affective information than the cognitive information.  
Similarly, when individuals were in a cognitive orientation, their evaluations were 





  Although this study provides evidence in favor of this matching hypothesis, 
the manipulation of affective information is questionable.  Descriptions about the 
animal, such as it has “soft fur” is “playful” and is “adorable” were considered 
“affective information” while facts such as “the animal’s feces is detrimental to soil” 
were considered “cognitive information.”  Although the affective information has the 
potential to create affective states such as warmth and adoration towards the animal, 
there is no direct evidence that any affective information was present.  Presenting 
participants with information such as “it has soft fur” could also be viewed solely as 
additional cognitive information.  
Edwards’ (1990) found similar results to those of van den Berg and 
colleagues’ study (2006) -- namely that cognitive or affective information about a 
fictional beverage is more influential when it matches one’s processing modality.  
However, in Edwards’ study, affective and cognitive states were manipulated by 
changing the order that information was presented.  Edwards argued that an affective 
state was induced when affective information was presented before cognitive 
information, and a cognitive state was induced when cognitive information was 
presented before affective information.  However, as Fabrigar and Petty (1999) point 
out, this manipulation rests on the assumption that a primacy effect was occurring.  
However, Edwards provides no evidence of such an effect.  It could be just as 
plausible that a recency effect occurred and that the data can be explained by a 
mismatching effect. 
Judged usability and situational factors. Situational factors such as the type of 




information is judged as usable in forming intergroup evaluations.  It has been 
suggested that certain types of evaluations are driven primarily by affect while other 
types of evaluations are driven primarily by cognitions (Dovidio, Esses, Beach, & 
Gaertner, 2002; Millar & Tessar, 1986).  Dovidio and colleagues (2002) assessed 
participants’ affective and cognitive responses towards Black individuals, as well as 
participants’ willingness to engage in future intergroup contact and endorsement of 
social policies (such as affirmative action).  They found that correlations between 
affect and evaluations of Blacks were strongest when the evaluations were related to 
willingness to engage in future intergroup contact.  Similarly, they found that 
correlations between cognitions and evaluations were strongest when the evaluations 
were measures of social policy endorsement.  In this study, it is possible that that a 
future intergroup encounter was higher in personal involvement to participants than 
an evaluation of a social issue that may or may not be important to the participant.  If 
this is true, the case can be made that in situations higher in personal involvement 
affective information may be judged as more appropriate and usable compared to 
situations that are lower in personal involvement.  Similarly, in situations lower in 
personal involvement cognitive information may be judged as more appropriate and 
usable compared to situations higher in personal involvement.  
The role of judged usability can provide a framework to understand under 
what circumstances affective information influences our attitudes towards social 
groups.  By taking into account the role of judged usability we can make predictions 
regarding the extent to which affective information is relied on more heavily than 




here is to demonstrate that the extent to which affective and cognitive information 
influences intergroup attitudes is first dependent on the extent to which that 
information is applicable.  Given that cognitive or affective information is applicable, 
the relative influence of this information on attitudes is based on the extent to which 
these sources of information are judged as usable.  Furthermore, the extent to which 
this information is judged as usable can be influenced by the discounting of 











Chapter 2: Pilot Study 
 
Overview 
The intent of the Pilot Study was to replicate the results of Cottrell and 
Neuberg (2005) that demonstrated that different social groups elicit distinct emotions.  
Additionally, the goal of this study was to specifically demonstrate that when 
thinking about gay men and African-Americans participants will report experiencing 
disgust and fear, respectively.  Demonstrating that individuals report experiencing 
different emotions in response to different social groups is necessary to establish that 
when considering evaluations of specific social groups, certain emotions are viewed 
as more applicable than others.  
 
Method 
Design. This study used a within-subjects design in which participants rated 
six different outgroups on the extent to which each group elicited 10 different 
emotions.    
Participants. Fifty-seven students enrolled in 200 level psychology courses at 
the University of Maryland participated in exchange for extra credit.  Because 
evaluations of social outgroups were desired, participants who identified as African-
American and/or as non-heterosexual (gay, lesbian, bisexual, or questioning) were not 





Procedures and materials.  Participants were approached in their classes and 
asked to participate in a study in exchange for extra credit.  Participants then 
completed a brief questionnaire created by the experimenter.  The survey asked 
participants to rate, on a 10-point Likert scale, the extent to which they experienced 
10 different emotions when thinking about six social groups.  Participants completed 
evaluations of the following social groups; Muslims, Feminists, Fundamentalist 
Christians, lesbians, gay men, and African-Americans.  Following the procedure of 
Cottrell and Neuberg (2005), for each group evaluation participants reported the 
extent to which they experienced the following emotions; anger, anxiety, contempt, 
disgust, envy, fear, guilt, pity, pride, and resentment.  The order in which participants 
rated the six social groups was counterbalanced. 
Results 
 My goal in this study was to demonstrate that when thinking about gay men 
and African-Americans participants will report experiencing distinct emotions.  
Specifically I predicted that individuals would report experiencing disgust towards 
gay men and fear towards African-Americans.  Analysis supported my hypothesis.  
Participants experienced significantly more disgust when thinking about gay men (M 
= 8.54, SD = 2.18) than when thinking about African-Americans (M = 4.11, SD = 
2.36), t(55) = 9.70, p < .001.  Furthermore, participants experienced significantly 
more fear when thinking about African-Americans (M = 7.58, SD = 2.40) than when 
thinking about gay men (M = 5.47, SD = 2.77), t(56) = 4.38,  p < .001 (See Figure 2).  




significantly more disgust than fear, t(56) = 6.62, p < .001.  Similarly, within 
evaluations of African-Americans, participants reported experiencing significantly 










Figure 2.  Reported levels of fear and disgust when thinking about gay men and 
African-Americans.  
Discussion 
 The results from the Pilot Study provide support for my hypothesis.  
Individuals reported experiencing different emotions in response to different social 
groups.  Participants reported fear as a stronger emotional response than disgust when 
thinking about African-Americans.  Additionally, participants reported disgust as a 
stronger emotional response than fear when thinking about gay men.   
The data are consistent with the results of Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) who 
found similar patterns of disgust and fear in evaluations of gay men and African-




individuals have different feelings towards different social groups, just has they have 
different cognitions towards different social groups (i.e. Kite & Whitley, 1998).  
Additionally, the results from Study 1 should be considered in conjunction with the 
research that has been conducted on the relationship between specific emotions and 
attitudes towards minority groups (Bos, Kok, & Dijker, 2001; Corenblum & Stephan, 
2001; Dijker, Koomen, van den Heuvel, & Fridja, 1996; Esses & Dovidio, 2002; 
Pelzer & Dijker, 2002), which has demonstrated that specific emotions are correlated 
with attitudes towards specific social groups.  However, there is currently no 
experimental data illustrating a causal influence between the experiencing of a 
discrete emotion and attitudes towards a specific social group.  It was therefore my 
intent to establish this causal link in Study 1.  Finally, in addition to demonstrating 
experimental support for the relationship between specific emotions and attitudes 
towards specific social groups, I sought to establish a framework that explains how 
specific emotions are related to our attitudes towards specific groups by 
demonstrating that emotions influence our attitudes when they are applicable and 




Chapter 3: Study 1 
 
Overview 
The goal of Study 1 was to demonstrate that when forming an evaluation of a 
social group, experiencing an applicable emotional experience (as opposed to a non-
applicable emotional experience) is necessary to influence an individual’s attitudes 
towards that group.  I predicted that when participants viewed a disgusting video clip 
their reported attitudes towards gay men would become more negative whereas 
reported attitudes towards African-Americans would not be influenced.  Similarly, 
when participants viewed a fear-arousing video clip their reported attitudes towards 
African-Americans would become more negative whereas reported attitudes towards 
gay men would not be influenced.  Additionally, it was my goal to demonstrate that 
the applicability of the emotional information is moderated by the extent to which 
that information is judged as usable.  Through a misattribution of emotion 
manipulation, an experimenter explicitly reminded participants that the video they 
were just exposed to evoked a specific emotion (fear or disgust).  I predicted that in 
this condition, the effect of the applicable emotion on the intergroup evaluation would 
be reduced.  A participant’s evaluation of gay men, for example, would no longer be 
influenced by his or her current state of disgust.  Because the participant knows the 
true source of his or her emotional state, his or her heightened level of disgust would 
not result in less liking towards gay men. Figure 3 illustrates the portion of the 





Figure 3: Examining the role of applicability and the judged usability of affective 
information in Study 1.  
Method 
Design.  A 2 (Emotion induced: Fear vs. Disgust) x 2 (Misattribution: 
Misattribution vs. No misattribution) x 2(Participant gender: Male vs. Female) 
between-subjects experimental design was used with, attitudes towards African-
Americans and gay men as dependent variables. 
Participants. Ninety-one individuals (51 women, 40 men) enrolled in 
psychology courses at the University of Maryland participated in exchange for course 




identified as African-American and/or as non-heterosexual (gay, lesbian, bisexual, or 
questioning) were not recruited for this study, or included in subsequent analysis.   
Procedure and Materials. Participants were recruited online to participate in 
what they believed were two separate studies.  In the first study participants were 
informed that the researchers were interested in the extent to which individuals can 
remember and recall information when it is presented in various mediums, such 
television and movie clips.  Participants were also informed that in order to give full 
credit for participation in the study, it had been paired up with an unrelated study.  
After participants consented to participation in both studies they were told they would 
be viewing a brief media clip.  Participants were asked to pay particular attention to 
the slides as they would be asked questions about them at a later point.     
 Participants then viewed one of two video clips that elicited either the emotion 
of fear or disgust.  Fear was induced by showing participants a two minute clip from 
the movie The Shining.  Disgust was induced by showing participants a two minute 
clip from the television show Dirty Jobs. The fear inducing video clip was selected as 
it has been used and validated in previous research to elicit fear (Gross & Levenson, 
1995; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007).  Rottenberg and colleagues (2007) have 
demonstrated that The Shining clip elicits more fear (Women:  M = 4.61, SD = 2.07; 
Men: M = 3.26, SD = 2.03) than disgust (Women:  M = 0.39, SD = 0.78; Men: M = 
0.0, SD = 0.00).  The video clip from Dirty Jobs was selected by the researcher.  Pilot 
data that I collected showed that Dirty Jobs elicits more disgust (Women:  M = 3.56, 
SD = 0.98; Men: M = 3.00, SD = 1.96) than fear (Women:  M = 0.94, SD = 0.42; 




 Immediately after viewing the video clip, a new experimenter approached the 
participants. In the misattribution condition the experimenter said, “OK, lets move on 
to the other study. Please come with me.”  However in the no misattribution condition 
the experimenter made an additional comment referring specifically to the clip as 
either being scary or disgusting by saying, “Oh that’s the one where you viewed the 
scary (disgusting) clip?  I heard about that study, a lot of participants are saying that 
that study made them feel really afraid (disgusted).  Ok let’s move on to the other 
study.  Please come with me.”   
After being taken to a separate room participants were then told that the 
researcher was interested in the social attitudes of college students.  They were then 
instructed to complete a social attitudes questionnaire.  The questionnaire was 
presented to participants online and the order of presentation of the items was 
randomized for each participant.  The social attitudes scale measures participants’ 
attitudes towards African-Americans and gay men using a 30-item Likert scale 
composed of questions modified from The Modern Homophobia Scale – Gay Men 
(MHS-G) (Raja & Stokes, 1998) and the Modern Racism Scale (MRS)(McConahay, 
1986).  The MHS-G is a 21-item Likert scale that measures homophobia towards gay 
men.  The MHS-G has been used in past research and has been found to be reliable (α 
= .95).  The MRS has been used in past research and has been found to be reliable (α 
= .84).  Items from each scale were modified so that the same item could assess 
attitudes towards both Black individuals and gay men.  For example, the MHS-G 
item, “I would remove my child from class if I found out the teacher was a gay man” 




out the teacher was Black” could be included.  Some items from the MHS-G and 
MRS scales were deleted as the modified versions of the statements were awkward or 
did not appear to make sense.  For example the MHS-G item “Male homosexuality is 
a psychological disease” is not worded in a way that an equivalent item can be written 
to assess attitudes towards Black individuals.  In the current study both the subscales 
of the social attitudes scale measuring attitudes towards Black individuals (α = .85) 
and gay men (α = .90) were reliable.  The social attitudes scale is presented in 
Appendix A.  After completing the social attitudes scale, participants were informed  
that they would not be completing a recall task and that the experiment was over. 
Results 
A 2 (Emotion induced: Fear vs. Disgust) x 2 (Misattribution: Misattribution 
vs. No misattribution) x 2(Participant gender: Male vs. Female) between-subjects 
MANOVA design was used with, attitudes towards Blacks and gay men entered as 
dependent variables.  There were no significant effects or interactions with gender on 
attitudes towards African-Americans, therefore all subsequent analysis regarding 
evaluations of African-Americans reports the data collapsed across gender.  
Significant gender effects and interactions of gender were present in analyses of 
attitudes towards gay men, therefore all subsequent analyses regarding evaluations of 
gay men include gender as a variable.   
Evaluations of African-Americans. Overall, there was no main effect of the 
emotion evoked on participant’s evaluations of African-Americans, F(1,87) = 2.68, p 
= .11. Participants did not significantly differ in reported attitudes towards African-




analysis did reveal an effect of the experimenter’s comment on reported attitudes 
towards African-Americans, F(1,87) = 9.28, p = .003.  Participants reported more 
negative attitudes towards African-Americans when the experimenter did not make a 
comment about the video being fear-arousing or disgusting (M = 4.83, SD = 0.83) 
compared to when the experimenter explicitly mentioned that the video was fear-
arousing or disgusting (M = 5.27 SD = 0.56). 
Of interest in this study was the predicted interaction of the emotion elicited 
and misattribution of arousal.  I predicted that when individuals viewed a fear-
arousing video they would report more negative attitudes towards African-Americans 
then when they viewed a disgusting video.  However, this difference would occur 
only when the experimenter made no comment about the clip being fear-arousing.  
When participants were reminded that their emotional state might have been caused 
by the video clip they just viewed I predicted no difference between attitudes towards 
African-Americans and attitudes towards gay men.  Supporting my hypothesis, the 
interaction between emotion elicited and misattribution of emotion was significant, 
F(1,87) = 4.32, p = .04.  As illustrated in Figure 4, when participants viewed a fear 
inducing video and were reminded that their emotional state may have been caused 
by the video they reported more positive attitudes towards African-Americans (M= 
5.30, SD = .55), than when they viewed a fear inducing video and were not reminded 
of the potential cause of their emotional state (M = 4.56, SD = .89), F(1, 87) = 13.58, 
p = .001.  Conversely, when participants viewed the disgust inducing video clip, there 
was no difference between those in the misattribution (M = 5.24, SD = 0.67) and no 





Figure 4: Attitudes towards African-Americans, as a function of emotion elicited and 
misattribution of emotion. 
Evaluations of gay men. Overall, men and women differed in their reported 
attitudes towards gay men, F(1,83) = 8.49, p =.005.  Men reported less positive 
attitudes towards gay men (M = 4.50, SD = 1.01) than did women (M = 5.05, SD = 
0.76). Reported attitudes towards gay men did not differ between those who viewed a 
fear-inducing video clip (M = 4.62, SD = 0.94) and those who viewed a disgust 
inducing video clip (M = 4.93, SD = 0.88), F(1,83) = 2.56, p =.11.   
There was, however, a significant main effect of misattribution on reported 
attitudes towards gay men, F(1,83) = 7.97, p =.006.  When the experimenter did not 
remind participants that the clip they viewed could evoke an emotional state, 
participants reported less positive attitudes towards gay men (M = 4.51, SD = 1.00) 
compared to when the experimenter reminded participants that the clip they viewed 




Regarding evaluations of gay men, I predicted that when individuals viewed a 
disgusting video they would report more negative attitudes towards gay men than 
when they viewed a fear-arousing video.  However, this difference would occur only 
when the experimenter made no comment about the clip being disgusting.  When 
participants were reminded that their emotional state might have been caused by the 
video clip they just viewed I predicted no difference between attitudes towards gay 
men and African-Americans.  I did not find support for this hypothesis.  There was no 
interaction between emotion elicited and misattribution of emotion, F(1,83) = .007, p 
= .99.  
Although not predicted, a three-way interaction of gender x emotion elicited x 
misattribution was found, F(1,83) = 4.59, p = .04.   Consistent with my original 
hypotheses, disgust influenced women’s judgments of gay men when the 
experimenter did not make a comment about the video. F(1,83) = 4.64, p = .03.  As 
illustrated in Figure 5, female participants who viewed a disgusting video clip and 
received no reminder of the video’s disgusting nature reported less positive attitudes 
towards gay men (M = 4.64, SD = 0.81) than female participants who viewed a 
disgusting video clip and were reminded of the video’s disgusting nature (M = 5.47, 
SD = 0.35).  Furthermore, as was predicted, women who viewed a fear-inducing 
video clip did not differ by misattribution condition in their evaluations of gay men, 
F(1,83) = 0.01, p = .93.  Female participants who were not reminded about the video 
(M = 5.03, SD = 0.68) did not differ in their evaluations of gay men from female 






Figure 5: Attitudes of female participants towards gay men, as a function of emotion 
elicited and misattribution of emotion. 
Contrary to my hypothesis, men who viewed the fear-arousing video clip 
evaluated gay individuals more negatively when they had not been reminded of the 
potential source of their fear (M = 3.67, SD = 0.76) compared to when they had been 
reminded of a potential source of their fear (M = 4.72, SD = 0.80), F(1,83) = 4.66, p 
= .03.  Furthermore, men who viewed a disgusting video clip and were reminded of 
the video (M = 4.92, SD = 0.72) did not differ from men who were not reminded of 
the video (M = 4.69, SD = 1.17) in their evaluations of gay men, F(1,83) = 0.52, p = 





Figure 6: Attitudes of male participants towards gay men, as a function of emotion 
elicited and misattribution of emotion. 
Discussion 
Overall, the results of this experiment provide some support for my hypothesis 
that in order for affective information to influence our attitudes it must first be 
applicable, and second, it must be judged as usable. Consistent with my prediction, 
evaluations towards African-Americans were more negative when an individual 
viewed a fear-inducing video compared to when he or she viewed a disgust inducing 
video.  This was expected because fear, as illustrated in the Pilot Study, is an 
applicable emotion towards African-Americans, whereas disgust is not.   
 Furthermore, the effect of the fear inducing video clip was moderated by the 
comment made by the experimenter after the viewing, lending support for the 
prediction that affective information must also be judged as usable for it to influence 




Blacks only when the experimenter did not make a comment reminding participants 
that they viewed a fear-arousing video clip.  When a comment was made, 
participants’ fear no longer influenced their judgment.  This data is consistent with 
prior misattribution of arousal research (Keltner et al., 1993; Schwarz et al., 1987).  
Because participants knew the true source of their arousal, their current emotional 
state was judged as irrelevant to the evaluation at hand, and therefore not used. 
 Results from evaluations of gay men lend partial support for my predictions.  
Analyzing men and women separately, I found an interaction between the emotion 
elicited from the video and misattribution of arousal.  As predicted, in women I found 
that evaluations towards gay men were influenced by the emotion of disgust but not 
fear.  While disgust was considered to be an applicable source of information in 
evaluating gay men, fear was not.  Additionally when women were aware of the true 
source of their emotions, disgust did not influence subsequent evaluations.  Similar to 
the evaluations of Blacks, their current emotional state was judged as irrelevant to the 
evaluation at hand, and therefore not used. 
 Unexpectedly, a similar pattern of results was found in evaluations of gay men 
by male participants, except that for men, fear was a more applicable emotion than 
disgust.  My initial hypothesis that both men and women would view disgust as an 
applicable emotion was not supported.  When men were disgusted, their emotional 
state did not affect their evaluations of gay men, regardless of misattribution 
condition.  On the contrary, when fear was induced in men, and they were not aware 
of the true source of their arousal, they reported more negative attitudes towards gay 




be considered when determining which emotional states are likely to influence 
attitudes towards some social groups.   
 With initial evidence providing support for the argument that information 
(whether cognitive or affective) must be deemed applicable and judged as usable in 
order for it to influence social judgments, I then turned to an examination of 
individual and situational factors that determine the extent to which information is 
judged as usable.  In Study 2 I examined individual difference factors, by examining 






Chapter 4: Study 2 
 
Overview 
The goal of Study 2 was to demonstrate that the extent to which affective 
information influences intergroup attitudes is determined by the judged usability of 
that information. I predicted that when an affective orientation was induced, high 
affective information would influence participants’ attitudes towards gay men more 
than neutral information.  Conversely, when a cognitive orientation was induced, 
there would be no difference between affective information and neutral information 
on the attitudes towards gay men.  In other words, information would be judged as 
more usable, and therefore influence subsequent judgments when it matched with the 
processing modality of the participant.  Figure 7 illustrates the portion of the proposed 
model examined in Study 2.   
I Used van den Berg et al’s (2006) word-search task to situationally induce 
either an affective or cognitive orientation in participants. I then exposed participants 
to a media display that elicited either a high (disgust) or low (control) emotional state.  
I used disgust as an applicable emotion based upon the results of Study 1 and 
previous research by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) that has shown that participants 
report high levels of disgust in response to thinking about gay men.  I predicted that 
when an affective orientation was induced, affective information such as disgust, 
would influence participants’ evaluations of gay men more than neutral affective 





Figure 7: Examining the role of applicability and the judged usability of affective 
information in Study 2. 
 
Method 
Design. A 2 (Processing modality: Affective vs. Cognitive) x 2 (Emotion 
primed: Disgust vs. Neutral) x 2(Participant gender: Male vs. Female) between-
subjects experimental design was used with, attitudes towards gay men entered as the 
dependent variable. 
 Participants. One hundred thirteen individuals (81 women, 32 men) enrolled 
in psychology courses at the University of Maryland participated in exchange for 




identified as non-heterosexual (gay, lesbian, bisexual, or questioning) were not 
recruited for this study, or included in subsequent analysis. 
Procedure and Materials. Participants were recruited online to participate in 
what they believed were two separate studies.  In the first study, participants were 
informed that the researchers are interested in “individual differences in task 
performance and recall as related to factors such as visual search ability.” Participants 
were then informed that they would first complete a timed word-search puzzle in 
order to determine their visual search ability.  Participants were given one of two 
word-search puzzles.  Half of the participants were given a puzzle that contained 
affectively based words.  The affectively based words were feeling, emotion, 
sensation, state of mind, intuition, impression, and experiencing.  The remaining half 
of the participants were given a puzzle that contained cognitively based words.  The 
cognitively based words were thinking, logic, analyzing, rational, knowing, mind, and 
reason.  This procedure has been used in prior research in order to manipulate 
cognitive and affective processing modalities (van den Berg, Manstead, van der Pligt, 
& Wigboldus, 2006). 
After completing the word-search puzzle participants were then informed that 
they would be viewing a slide show and would be tested on their recall of the slides at 
a later point.  They were instructed that they would be viewing 10 different images, 
and each image would be shown three times.  Participants then viewed a disgust 
inducing presentation, or a neutral presentation.  The elicitation of disgust was 
manipulated using selected images from the International Affective Picture System 




photographic images classified into affective categories using average ratings of 
affective valence and arousal.   Participant ratings on the IAPS have good stability 
over time and covary with emotional behaviors and physiological events such as heart 
rate and skin conductance response (Greenwald, Cook, & Lang, 1989; Lang, 1995; 
Lang et al., 1993).  Of interest in this study were those IAPS images that have been 
shown to elicit disgust in addition to those IAPS images that have been shown to 
elicit low levels of all emotions (control images) (Lang, 1995; Lang et al., 1993).  
After viewing the slide presentation, participants were informed that next they 
would be participating in a separate experiment investigating the social attitudes of 
college students.  Participants completed a modified version of the social attitudes 
survey used in Study 1.  In Study 2, only items that assessed attitudes towards gay 
men were included.  The survey was presented to participants online and the order of 
presentation of the items was randomized for each participant.  After completing the 
social attitudes scale, participants were informed that they would not be completing a 
recall task and that the experiment was over. 
Results 
A 2 (Processing modality: Affective vs. Cognitive) x 2 (Emotion primed: 
Disgust vs. Neutral) x 2 (Participant gender: Male vs. Female) between-subjects 
ANOVA design was used with, attitudes towards gay men entered as dependent 
variables.  Analysis revealed a significant effect of gender on attitudes towards gay 
men.  Male participants (M = 4.10, SD = 0.81) reported less positive attitudes 




p < .001.  The remaining main effects of processing modality, F(1, 105) = 0.81, p = 
.37, and emotion elicited, F(1, 105) = .27, p = .60, were not significant. 
I predicted a significant processing modality x emotion elicited interaction.  
Exposure to a high affective message (disgust) should have influenced individuals’ 
attitudes towards gay men more when they were in an affective processing modality 
compared to when they were in a cognitive processing modality.  Furthermore, a low 
affective message (neutral) should not have influenced participants’ attitudes towards 
gay men, regardless of processing modality.  Analysis did not reveal support for this 
hypothesis.  The two-way interaction between processing modality and emotion 
elicited was not significant, F(1, 105) = 0.32 p = .57.   
My initial predictions did not account for gender differences in the above 
mentioned two-way processing modality x emotion type interaction.  Analysis 
however revealed a significant three-way interaction between gender, processing 
modality, and emotion elicited, F(1, 105) = 4.24, p = .04.  Among women, the results 
are consistent with my hypothesis while among men the results are not consistent 
with my hypothesis. 
 Among women, when participants were primed to process information in an 
affective orientation they reported more negative attitudes towards gay men when 
they viewed emotion (disgust) inducing images (M=4.49, SD = 1.16) compared to 
when they viewed neutral images (M = 5.29, SD = 0.71), F(1, 105) = 8.51, p = .004.  
On the other hand, when female participants were primed to process information in a 
cognitive orientation there were no differences in attitudes towards gay men between 




those who viewed neutral images (M = 4.82, SD = 0.96), F(1, 105) = 0.56, p = .45.  
These results are illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Attitudes towards gay men among female participants, as a function of 
processing modality and emotion elicited. 
Contrary to my hypothesis, the type of information presented to male 
participants did not influence evaluations of gay men, regardless of processing 
modality.  When male participants were primed to process information in an affective 
modality, there were no differences in reported attitudes towards gay men among 
those who viewed emotion (disgust) inducing images (M = 4.34, SD = 0.56) 
compared to those who viewed neutral images (M = 3.56, SD = 0.58), F(1, 105) = 
2.18, p = 0.14.  Similarly, when male participants were primed to process information 
in a cognitive modality, there were no differences in reported attitudes towards gay 
men among those who viewed emotion (disgust) inducing images (M = 4.35, SD = 
1.02) compared to those who viewed neutral images (M = 4.15, SD = 0.77), F(1, 105) 





Consistent with the results from Study 1, the results from Study 2 highlight 
the need to take into consideration gender differences regarding attitudes towards gay 
men.  In Study 2, the data from female participants are consistent with my 
predictions.  Disgust was judged as a more usable source of information when 
individuals were processing information in an affective modality compared to when 
they were processing information in a cognitive modality.  Furthermore, this finding 
is consistent with previous research that has shown that information that matches an 
individual’s processing modality is more influential in attitude formation and 
persuasion (Edwards, 1990, Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; van den Berg, Manstead, van der 
Pligt, & Wigboldus, 2006).  An individual in a cognitive processing orientation will 
judge cognitive information as more usable, and therefore be more influential.  
Similarly, as demonstrated in this study (in women), an individual in an affective 
processing orientation will judge affective information as more usable, and therefore 
it will be more influential. 
 This matching effect, however, was not found in male participants.  There 
were no differences between processing modalities in the extent to which affective 
information influenced men’s attitudes towards gay men.    Consistent with the results 
from Study 1, this lack of an effect could be due to the fact that when men think about 
gay men, fear is a more applicable emotion than disgust.  For the processing modality 
to influence their judgments towards gay men, the affective information had to first 




Although limited to female participants, Study 2 provided initial support for 
the hypothesis that judged usability is influenced by individual difference factors such 
as processing modality.  In women, affective information was judged as more usable 
when participants were in an affective processing modality.  The goal of Study 3 was 
to examine situational influences on judged usability, by manipulating the personal 












Chapter 5:  Study 3 
 
Overview 
The purpose of Study 3 was to examine the extent in which situational factors, 
such as the personal importance of intergroup encounters, influence the judged 
usability of affective and cognitive information.  In Study 3, after completing a self-
report measure indicating affective and cognitive reactions to gay men, participants 
were informed they would be talking about a topic that was either high or low in 
personal involvement.  Participants then entered a room where a gay male 
confederate was seated and were instructed to “grab a seat.”  Of interest was the 
distance participants sat from the gay male confederate.  I predicted that in a high 
personal involvement condition, participants’ affective reactions towards gay men 
would be a stronger predictor of intergroup social distance than their cognitive 
reactions towards gay men.  In a low personal involvement condition I predicted the 
opposite; participants’ cognitive reactions towards gay men would be a stronger 
predictor of intergroup social distance than their affective reactions towards gay men.  
Although there was no manipulation of applicability in Study 3, participants reported 
their own affective and cognitive reactions towards gay men, and therefore I assumed 
that the information would be applicable.  Additionally, the judged usability of the 
affective and cognitive information reported by participants was manipulated through 




another individual.  Figure 9 illustrates the portion of the model examined in this 
study.   
  
Figure 9: Examining the role of applicability and the judged usability of affective and 
cognitive information in Study 3. 
Method 
Design. A multivariate regression design was used to accommodate both 
dichotomous and continuous predictor variables.  Personal involvement was a 
dichotomous variable with participants assigned to either a low or high personal 




evaluations of gay men were assessed as continuous variables.  Social distance was 
entered as the outcome variable. 
Participants. Fifty-four individuals (31 women, 23 men) enrolled in 
psychology courses at the University of Maryland participated in exchange for course 
credit.  Because evaluations of social outgroups were desired, participants who 
identified as non-heterosexual (gay, lesbian, bisexual, or questioning) were not 
recruited for this study, or included in subsequent analysis. 
Procedure and Materials. Individuals participated in what they believed were 
two separate studies.  In the first study participants were informed that the researchers 
were interested in assessing students’ social attitudes towards various social groups.  
At this time participants were informed that we were interested in student attitudes 
towards African-Americans, the elderly, gay men, Muslims, Asian-Americans and 
Hispanic/Latino/Latina individuals.  Participants were then informed that they would 
be randomly assigned one of these groups to evaluate.  In order to determine which 
group they would evaluate, they would draw a slip of paper from a bag.  Participants 
would then be asked to evaluate the group they selected.  The procedure was 
manipulated to ensure that all participants selected gay men. After selecting a social 
group participants completed the assessment of stereotypic beliefs, symbolic beliefs, 
and affect.  These surveys are open-ended measures created by Haddock and 
colleagues (1993).   In the assessment of stereotypic beliefs, participants were asked 
to list the characteristics they would use to describe a typical gay man.  After 
completing this task, they were then asked to rate each characteristic on a 5-point 




asked to indicate the percentage of group members who possess each characteristic.  
Stereotype scores were calculated in the following manner: First, the valence of each 
characteristic was multiplied by the proportion of group members believed to possess 
that characteristic.  These scores were then summed and divided by the number of 
characteristics listed to create an overall score.   
In the assessment of symbolic beliefs measure, participants were asked to list 
the values, customs, and traditions they believe are blocked or facilitated by typical 
gay men.  They were then asked to rate the extent to which each value, custom, or 
tradition is blocked or facilitated by typical group members on a 5-point scale ranging 
from -2 (almost always blocked) to +2 (almost always facilitated).  Participants were 
then asked to indicate the percentage of group members they believed block or 
facilitate each value.  The symbolic belief score was calculated in the same manner as 
the stereotype score.   
In the assessment of affect measure, participants were asked to list the feelings 
or emotions they experience when they see, meet, or think about typical members of 
the group they selected.  They were then given similar instructions as the assessment 
of stereotype measure regarding the valence of each emotion and the percentage of 
group members who evoke each emotion.  The affect score was calculated in the 
same manner as the stereotype and symbolic belief scores.  
Participants were then debriefed for the first experiment and the experimenter 
entered informing the participants that in the next study they will be participating in a 
one-on-one interaction with another student to discuss various social issues.   At this 




high personal involvement condition participants were informed, “In this discussion, 
we want you to discuss with your group member, thoughts about your romantic life, 
whether that be past or present dating experiences.”  In the low personal involvement 
condition participants were informed, “In this discussion, we want you to discuss with 
your group member thoughts about student food choices on campus.”   
 The experimenter then pointed participants down a hallway into a classroom 
where a male confederate was seated in the corner wearing a t-shirt that said, “I kiss 
boys.”  When the participant entered the room the confederate informed the 
participant that he was told to tell them to grab a chair from the stack in the corner 
and have a seat.  Once the participant was seated in his or her chair, the experimenter 
entered the room and secured the location of the participants’ chair.   The number of 
inches between the confederate’s and the participant’s chair was measured. Once this 
measurement occurred participants were debriefed and informed of the true nature of 
the experiment. 
Results 
A preliminary analysis was conducted to assess the presence of gender effects 
and gender interactions.  No significant gender effects or interactions were found, 
therefore data were collapsed across gender.   Data were then analyzed using a 
simultaneous regression equation with social distance entered as the outcome variable 
and personal involvement condition, affect score, cognition score, personal 





Analysis of main effects found a significant relationship between participants 
cognitions about gay men and the distance they sat from the gay confederate, β = -
0.80, t(40) = -2.51, p = .02. The more individuals reported positive cognitions about 
gay men the closer they sat to a gay male confederate.  No relationship was found 
between participants emotions about gay men and the distance they sat from the 
confederate, β = 0.53, t(40) = 1.81, p = .08.  Similarly, no main effect of level of 
personal involvement on social distance was found, β = -.23, t(40) = -1.36, p = .18.  
The extent to which the discussion topic was high or low in personal involvement was 
not related to the distance individuals sat from the gay confederate. 
I predicted that under situations of low personal importance individuals’ 
behaviors towards a gay confederate would be best predicted by their cognitions 
towards gay men.  Supporting my hypothesis, regression analysis yielded a 
significant cognition x personal relevance condition interaction on social distance, β 
= 0.85, t(40) = 2.72, p = .01. The relationship between a participant’s cognitions 
about gay men and his or her social distance from a gay confederate was influenced 
by the conversation topic’s degree  
of personal involvement. When individuals discussed student food choices on 
campus, a topic of low personal importance, more positive cognitions about gay men 
were associated with a closer distance between the participant’s and confederate’s 
chair, β = -0.63, t(20) = -2.39, p = .03.  As participants reported more positive 
cognitions about gay men, they tended to sit closer to the gay confederate.  On the 
other hand, when students discussed their dating lives, a topic higher in personal 




distance between the participant’s and confederate’s chair, β = 0.34, t(20) = 1.23, p = 
.24. For each condition, following the procedure of Aiken and West (1991) I plotted 
the predicted values of participants’ social distance from the gay confederate at the 
mean, one standard deviation above the mean, and one standard deviation below the 









Figure 10:  Relationship between cognitions and social distance as a function of 
personal involvement 
Additionally, I predicted that in situations of high personal involvement 
emotions would more strongly correlate with social distance towards the gay male 
confederate than in situations of low personal involvement.  Contrary to my 
hypothesis, analysis revealed that the interaction of emotion x condition on social 
distance was not significant, β =.-0.57 t(40) = -2.05, p =.05.  There were no 
differences regarding the extent to which emotion scores predicted social distance in 













Figure 11:  Relationship between affect and social distance as a function of personal 
involvement 
Discussion 
Although the overall hypotheses that affect would best predict social distance 
in situations of high personal involvement while cognitions would best predict social 
distance in situations of low personal involvement was not supported, I did find 
preliminary evidence suggesting that the judged usability of cognitions are influenced 
by situational factors.  When participants were under the impression that they would 
be talking about a topic of low personal importance, there was a significant 
relationship between cognitions towards gay men and the distance between the 
participant and a gay confederate.  In the low personal involvement condition, the 
more positive cognitions participants reported towards gay men, the closer they sat to 
the gay confederate.  On the other hand, when participants were under the impression 
that they would be talking about a topic of high personal importance, there was no 




participant and a gay confederate.  These findings are consistent with previous 
research that suggests that situational factors such as personal involvement are 
important variables to consider when determining the judged usability of information.  
Dovidio and colleagues (2002), for example found that cognitions were better 
predictors of more “removed” evaluations of social policy (such as affirmative action) 
compared to more personal evaluations (such as willingness for intergroup contact). 
The remainder of my predictions were not substantiated in the analysis of 
Study 3.  I predicted that emotional responses towards gay men would predict social 
distance from a gay confederate under situations of high personal importance but not 
under situations of low personal importance.  Unfortunately, participant’s affective 
responses towards gay men were not related to social distance from a gay confederate 






Chapter 6:  General Discussion 
 
Conclusions 
Overall, I have demonstrated initial support for my hypotheses regarding the 
importance of applicability and judged usability as moderators for the extent to which 
affective and cognitive information influences intergroup evaluations.  Primarily, the 
results from these studies demonstrate the role of applicability and judged usability in 
the use of affective information on intergroup judgments.  In the Pilot Study, I 
provided support for the hypothesis that specific emotions are applicable to specific 
social groups.  Specifically, I found that individuals primarily experience fear (but not 
disgust) when thinking about African-Americans.  Conversely, individuals primarily 
experience disgust (but not fear) when thinking about gay men.  In other words, just 
as specific beliefs, or stereotypes, are applicable to certain social groups, specific 
emotions are applicable to specific social groups.  This data is consistent with 
previous research that has demonstrated that specific emotions such as disgust, fear, 
pity and contempt are frequently associated with social groups such as gay men, 
African-Americans, Native-Americans, and welfare recipients, respectively (Cottrell 
& Neuberg, 2005; Fiske et al., 2002).   
The results from Study 1 expanded upon the results of the Pilot Study by 
experimentally demonstrating that emotions influence our judgments about social 
groups only to the extent that the emotion is applicable, or relevant.  Individuals 
reported more negative attitudes towards African-American individuals when fear 




is not an emotion typically associated with African-Americans, the influence of the 
emotion was less than the influence of fear, an emotion typically associated with 
African-Americans (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).   
The most applicable emotion in respect to evaluations of gay men differed by 
gender.  In women, attitudes towards gay men became more negative only if the 
emotion induced was disgust.  Inductions of fear had no effect on their evaluations.  
On the contrary, in men, attitudes towards gay men became more negative when the 
emotion induced was fear.  Inductions of disgust had no effect on their evaluations.  
Although this was not a prediction that I initially made, these results are not 
incompatible with the proposal that affective information influences intergroup 
evaluations based on the extent to which it is applicable.  Men and women hold 
different beliefs and attitudes towards gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered (glbt) 
individuals, with men endorsing more negative stereotypes and holding more 
negative attitudes towards glbt individuals than women (see Herek, 1984; Kite & 
Whitley, 1996).  If we consistently find that men and women hold different 
cognitions about glbt individuals, it should be considered that men and women may 
have different emotional reactions towards glbt individuals.  Unfortuanately, I was 
unable to assess the gender of participants in the Pilot Study to assess whether or not 
these gender differences were present when thinking about gay men.  These findings 
are however, consistent with previous research. 
Bojarska-Nowaczyk (2005) has found that when heterosexual individuals think 
about physical or emotional contact with gay or lesbian individuals they experience 




words, heterosexual men report greater fear of gay men than heterosexual women, 
whereas heterosexual women report greater fear of lesbians than heterosexual men.  
Similarly, among men, the fear of contracting HIV/AIDS is associated with increased 
discomfort with homosexual people (Eldridge, Mack, & Swank, 2006; Lewes, 1992).  
From the admittedly limited amount of research on gender differences in emotional 
reactions to gay men, it appears heterosexual men are more afraid of gay men than 
women.  This increased level of fear appears to derive mostly from the possibility of 
physical contact and sexual activity.  If men experience fear more than women when 
thinking about gay men, this helps to explain why men reported more negative 
attitudes towards gay men in a condition in which fear was induced.  Similarly, with 
no possibility of a sexual advance, there is no reason for women to feel afraid of a gay 
man.  Instead women are influenced more by feelings of disgust, which were reported 
in the Pilot Study as the predominant emotion associated with gay men.  Furthermore, 
although there has been no research on gender differences on feelings of disgust 
towards gay men, research has shown that in general women report stronger feelings 
of disgust than men (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Schienle, Schäfer, Stark, Walter, & 
Vaitl, 2005).  This is also substantiated by research that has shown that women 
experience greater physiological responses (eg. skin conductance) to disgust 
inductions than men (Rohrmann, Hopp, & Quirin, 2008).  Therefore, it is possible 
that in general, disgust is an emotion that is more frequently experienced by women, 
and therefore it is more applicable. 
The unexpected finding that men reported more negative attitudes towards gay 




more negative attitudes towards African-Americans when fear was induced, can be 
examined according to the evolutionary psychology perspective.  According to this 
perspective, the ultimate human motivation is to pass one’s genes into future 
generations.  In order to attain this goal, one must survive till reproductive age and 
mate successfully.  Furthermore, anything that interferes with this process is a threat 
(Bridgeman, 2003; Cartwright, 2000).  Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) report that in 
response to evaluations of African-American individuals participants report feeling 
threats to their physical safety.  If physical safety is under attack one may not survive 
and therefore will not be able to pass along their genes. From this view, it is not 
surprising that both men and women reported more negative attitudes towards 
African-Americans when fear was induced.   
The evolutionary perspective can help to explain why, contrary to my hypothesis, 
men reported more negative attitudes towards gay men when fear was elicited 
whereas women did not.  Heterosexual men report fear towards gay men due to the 
possibility of physical contact and sexual activity (Bojarska-Nowaczyk, 2005; 
Eldridge, et al., 2006; Lewes, 1992).  If a heterosexual man engages in any form of 
physical or intimate contact with a gay man, his status as a heterosexual may be 
questioned.  If a woman perceives a male as a homosexual, she is less likely to select 
him as a mate and therefore his genes will not be passed along to future generations.  
Conversely, this process would not occur in women.  A women’s association with a 
gay men should not influence the likelihood of a potential mate selecting her for 
reproduction.  Unfortunately research from the evolutionary perspective on gender 




In Study 1, individuals who watched a fear-inducing video clip reported more 
negative attitudes towards African-Americans than individuals who watched a 
disgusting video clip.  However, this difference was eliminated when the 
experimenter made a comment about the clip being fear-arousing. A similar effect 
occurred when women watched a disgusting video clip, and men watched a fear-
arousing video clip, and then evaluated gay men.  Participants inaccurately attributed 
their emotional states to the social groups they were evaluating.  However, when 
there was reason to believe that the current emotional state was caused by some other 
source, evaluations were unaffected.  This misattribution of arousal effect has been 
replicated across numerous studies (Keltner et al., 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 
Schwarz & Clore, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1985; Schwarz et al., 1987) and has provided 
consistent support that affect influences subsequent judgments when it is not 
attributed to other sources, and is therefore judged as usable.  While at the same time 
compatible with previous “affect as information” studies, the data from Study 1, are 
to the best of my knowledge, the first to manipulate specific, discrete emotions.  
Study 1 demonstrated that the classic misattribution of arousal effect is less likely to 
occur when the arousal state is a specific and non-applicable emotion. 
Additionally, the extent to which individuals judge information as usable is 
associated with individual differences in processing modalities (Haddock, Maio, 
Arnold, & Huskinson, 2008; Huskinson & Haddock, 2008).  Haddock and colleagues 
(2008) presented individuals with persuasive messages that were either affectively or 
cognitively based.  They found that the affectively based persuasive measures were 




in Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  Conversely cognitively based 
persuasive messages were most effective in individuals high in Need for Cognition 
and low in Need for Affect.  These results are consistent with my proposal that judged 
usability influences the extent to which information influences attitudes.  Individuals 
high in Need for Cognition are motivated to seek out and engage in effortful 
processing.  As a result, cognitive information that satisfies this need is likely to be 
valued more, and as a result is likely to be deemed more usable.  Similarly, 
individuals high in Need for Affect seek out emotional experiences, and along the 
same lines are likely to deem affective information more usable. 
In Study 2 I situationally induced states cognitive and affective processing states. 
In women, I found that the experiencing of disgust caused women to report more 
negative attitudes towards gay men when an affective processing modality was 
induced, compared to when a cognitive processing modality was induced.  
Individuals were more likely to judge the affective information as usable when they 
were primed to process affective, as opposed to cognitive information.  The results 
from Study 2 are consistent with previous research (Edwards, 1990; Fabrigar & Petty, 
1999; van den Berg, Manstead, van der Pligt, & Wigboldus, 2006) and build upon 
previous findings by establishing a causal relationship between processing modality 
and attitudes and evaluations.  The absence of an effect of processing modality on 
attitudes towards gay men in heterosexual male participants is not surprising when 
considered in retrospect with the results of Study 1.  If, as has been suggested, fear is 
a primary reaction to gay men in heterosexual men, inducing disgust should not 




modality.  If the emotional state is not applicable, then a judgment of usability is not 
necessary.   
Implications 
Action tendencies. This framework of understanding that information is likely 
to influence attitudes when it is applicable and judged as usable can be viewed as 
useful when taken into consideration with research on action tendencies.  Frijda 
(1986) and others (Izard, 1991; Plutchik, 1980; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994) 
have proposed and demonstrated that discrete emotions are associated with specific 
action tendencies. For example, anger is associated with the propensity to aggress 
against the person who evoked the emotion.  Fear on the other hand is associated with 
the need to escape from the fear inducing situation or object.  Similarly, disgust is 
associated with active avoidance and rejection of the offending object. 
 If we are able to gain a better understanding of the circumstances in which 
emotional experiences influence attitudes we can gain a greater understanding of the 
behaviors that often occur in intergroup relations.  For example, if we know that a 
woman’s attitude towards gay men is influenced by disgust, and this is especially true 
if that woman is high in Need for Affect (Maio & Esses, 2001) we would predict that 
this individual is more likely to go out of her way to actively avoid any sort of 
interaction with gay men.  Similarly, if we can demonstrate that individuals 
experience anger in response to thinking about Arabs (or terrorism, which implies 
Arab individuals)(Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich & Morgan, 2006) and can then lay out 
the circumstances in which anger is judged as usable, we can identify situations in 




 Prejudice reduction. The traditional conceptualization of prejudice can be 
described as a negative evaluation.  This traditional approach has frequently 
overlooked the role that affective information may play in many circumstances.  As a 
result, numerous prejudice reduction techniques focus on challenging or changing 
stereotypes and beliefs about social groups.  This approach can be problematic to the 
extent that while some individuals may be influenced by “cognitive appeals” other 
individuals may be more influenced by “emotional appeals.”  If we are able to 
understand when affective and cognitive information is applicable and usable, we can 
tailor prejudice reduction strategies to the right people and the right situations. 
Devine and Monteith (1993), for example, have shown that pointing out 
inconsistencies between what participants would do in an intergroup behavior and 
what they should do in an intergroup behavior produces feelings of guilt and 
compunction.  These emotional reactions were found to cause individuals to act more 
favorably towards an outgroup in the future.   Knowing that affective information 
differs in the extent to which it is used and knowing that individual differences 
influence the extent to which one judges cognitive and affective information as 
usable, one can tailor prejudice reduction strategies such as the one described to 
individuals that are most likely to benefit from them.  Devine and Monteiths’ 
procedure (1993) for example, is likely to be more effective in individuals high in 
need Need for Affect (Maio & Esses, 2001) since the prejudice reduction technique 
relies on the experiencing of emotions.  Similarly, individuals high in Need for 
Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) may be unswayed by this prejudice reduction 




experiences is likely to judge an emotional experience as less relevant than factual 
information, and is therefore less likely to change his or her attitude. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Measuring emotions. The results from Study 3 provide little support for the 
hypothesis that the extent to which affective and cognitive information is judged as 
usable is influenced by the type of evaluation.  It was my hypothesis that when 
judgments were high in personal importance affective information would be judged 
as more usable than cognitive information.  Conversely, I hypothesized that when 
judgments were low in personal importance cognitive information would be judged as 
more usable than affective information.  In a situation of low personal importance I 
did find that cognitions predicted social distance from a gay individual while 
emotions about gay men did not predict social distance.  Under a high personal 
involvement condition neither emotions nor cognitions were related to social 
distance. 
 The most likely explanation for the lack of support for my hypothesis arrives 
from the difficulty in asking individuals to report their emotional experiences.  In 
Study 3, participants reported which emotions they feel when thinking about gay 
men.  They also reported the strength of these emotional reactions.  Unfortunately, 
studies have demonstrated that individuals are often inaccurate in estimating the 
intensity of their emotions (Buehler & McFarland, 2001).  In other words, although 
participants might have correctly identified which emotional state they experience 




weak, moderate, or intense emotions.   If this is the case, the usefulness of such self-
report measures of emotions should be questioned. 
 Additionally, misattribution of arousal studies, as well as the data from Study 
1 call into doubts the extent to which individuals can correctly attribute their 
emotional experiences to the correct source (Keltner et al., 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 
1983; Schwarz & Clore, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1985; Schwarz et al., 1987).  In an 
experimental setting, a participant is asked to report on a survey what emotions he or 
she experiences when thinking about gay men.  A participant may introspect and 
notice his or her heightened level of anxiety and nervousness.  As a result he or she 
may infer that he or she feels nervous and anxious when thinking about gay men.  
However, it is entirely plausible that the nervousness and anxiousness is elicited by 
the experimental setting itself.  This possibility of participants misattributing their 
emotional states presents a large hindrance to research that involves emotions.  How 
can you study emotional reactions to social groups, and their influences, if research 
suggests individuals may not always know the true source of their affective states?  In 
order to address this limitation, it is vital that research paradigms that include self-
reported emotions also include experimental inductions of those emotions.  By doing 
so, we can experimentally test the relationship between specific emotions and 
attitudes towards specific groups. 
Confounded manipulations.  It would be inappropriate not to acknowledge 
additional limitations and confounds present in Study 3.  In Study 3, participants were 
led to believe they would be participating in a discussion topic of either high or low 




would be talking about their personal romantic lives.  On the other hand individuals 
in the low importance condition believed they would be talking about student food 
choices on campus.  Unfortunately, because the content of the discussions differed, it 
is possible something other than personal importance was manipulated.  Participants 
in the high importance condition, for example, may have felt more anxious than 
participants talking about an arguably benign topic.  Therefore significant effects 
from Study 3 involving personal involvement are susceptible to alternative 
explanations.  A replication of this study where the content in the high and low 
involvement conditions is identical would address this issue.   
Low power. Nonsignificant results from Study 3 could also be the result of 
low power due to a small sample size. A power analysis reveals that in order to have 
80% power for detecting a moderate effect size of .15 for a regression F test with 5 
predictor variables (Cohen, 1977, 1988) 92 participants would have been needed.  
Insignificant results, such as the nonsignificant interaction between emotion and 
cognition (p=.05), and the absence of any gender effects, which were present in 
Studies 1 and 2, may have been significant with a larger sample size. 
Comparing cognitions and emotions. In part due to the problems in accurately 
measuring emotions in Study 3, I was not able to assess situational factors that 
influence the extent to which affective or cognitive information is related to social 
behaviors.  As a result, our understanding of the role of applicability and judged 
usability on intergroup evaluations is currently exclusive to affective information.  
Results from these series of studies do not provide us with information on how and 




evaluations.  Additional research that relies on improved methods of measuring 
emotions, should continue to examine questions such as those in Study 3.  For 
example additional research should consider situational factors that moderate the 
extent to which affective or cognitive information plays a role in our intergroup 
behaviors and attitudes.  Continuing to study this line of research will be of particular 
benefit as it will help to address some of the inconsistencies in current research.   
For example, while some research indicates that the relationship between 
affect and attitudes is stronger than that between cognition and attitudes (Esses, 
Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Haddock et al., 1993; Jussim, Nelson, Manis, & Soffin, 
1995; Stangor et al., 1991), other research has shown that the relationship between 
cognition and attitudes is stronger than between affect and attitudes (Bos, Kok, & 
Dijker, 2001; Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1994).    However, these apparent 
inconsistencies can be better understood when we take into the consideration the roles 
of applicability and/or judged usability in these studies.   For example, Stangor and 
colleagues (1991, Study 2) assessed participants’ listings of stereotypes and emotions 
that they associated with several social groups.  They then correlated these scores 
with a modified version of the Bogardus social distance scale (Bogardus, 1925).  
Items included questions such as “I would be willing to marry” and “I would enjoy 
having as my closest professional or business colleague.”  They found that affect was 
a stronger predictor of social distance than stereotypes.  Similarly, Jussim and 
colleagues (1995) asked participants to read a vignette of a person they were lead to 
believe was real and then rate how much they liked the individual.  They found that 




character, was best at predicting liking of the character.  In both of these studies, it 
seems plausible to argue that affective information was judged as more usable due to 
the high personal involvement of the evaluation.  In the first study participants 
thought about how much they would like various social situations in which they 
would interact with the target group.   In the second study, although the character was 
not present, participants were evaluating a seemingly real person as opposed to 
indicating their social attitudes about a group in general (such as attitudes towards 
child abusers).  Additional research that addresses these findings are consistent with 
my predictions from Study 3 and previous research that’s appears to suggest that 
more personal evaluations, such as willingness to engage in intergroup contact 
(Dovidio et al., 2002) are influenced more by affective information. 
Conversely, studies such as Bos and colleagues’ (2001) have found that 
cognitions are stronger predictors of social attitudes than affective responses.  In this 
study, participants responded over a telephone interview the extent to which they had 
a positive attitude towards persons with HIV/AIDS.  The point of distinction between 
this methodology and that of those described above (such as Jussim et al., 1995) is 
that participants in this study were not evaluating their personal comfort with persons 
with HIV/AIDS or their attitude towards any one person.  The format asked more 
general questions about overall attitudes towards a social group and therefore 
cognitive information was likely to be judged as more usable than affective 







                           Social Attitudes Scale 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
eighteen statements using the scale below.  There are no wrong or right answers 
so please answer each question honestly.  
 
1: Strongly Disagree 
2: Moderately Disagree 
3: Slightly Disagree 
4: Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5: Slightly Agree 
6: Moderately Agree 
7: Strongly Agree 
 
1._____Over the past few years, Black people have received more economically than 
they deserve.  
2._____I would remove my child from class if I found out the teacher was gay.  
3._____I don’t think it would negatively affect our relationship if I learned that one 
of my close relatives was a gay man.  
4._____I welcome new friends who are gay men.  
5._____Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.   
6._____I am tired of hearing about Black individual’s problems.  
7._____Discrimination against Black people is no longer a problem in the United 
States.  
8._____I would remove my child from class if I found out the teacher was Black. 
9._____Black people want too many rights.  
10_____Blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.  
11_____Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more 
respect for Black individuals than they deserve.  
12_____Discrimination against gay men is no longer a problem in the United States. 
13_____ I am tired of hearing about gay men’s problems.  
14_____It is easy to understand the anger of Black people in the United States.  
15_____Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more 
respect for gay men than they deserve.  
16_____I don’t mind companies using Black celebrities to advertise their 
products.   
17_____I would not vote for a political candidate who was an openly gay man.  
18_____ I would not mind working with a Black person.  
19_____I welcome new friends who are Black.  
20_____I would not vote for a political candidate who is a Black person.  




22_____I wouldn’t mind going to a party that included Black people.  
23_____I don’t mind companies using openly gay male celebrities to advertise their 
products. 
24_____I don’t think it would negatively affect our relationship if I learned that one 
of my in-laws was a Black person.  
25_____I would not mind working with a gay man.  
26_____Gay men should not push themselves where they are not wanted.  
27_____Gay men are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
28_____I wouldn’t mind going to a party that included gay men.  
29_____Over the past few years, gay men have received more economically than 
they deserve.  
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